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NOTES
Specific Personal Jurisdiction over Foreign
Corporate Defendants
I. INTRODUCTION
Modem commercial transactions often involve parties from a
broad geographical area. Commonly, a manufactured product will be
composed of smaller parts--components-and each component may
be manufactured in a different country. The actual assembly of these
components may occur in a foreign country as well. Finally, the fin-
ished product may be distributed in the United States as well as other
foreign countries.
Should a foreign-made component part fail and cause injury,
what are the injured party's chances of suing the foreign manufac-
turer in the United States? After all, while the final assembler of the
product dealt directly with the U.S. in selling its product here, the
component manufacturer probably had only an indirect link to the
domestic forum.
In asserting jurisdiction over the component manufacturer, a
trial court must heed constitutional due process guarantees' afforded
to the component manufacturer. 2 Since the manufacturer's link to the
domestic forum may be characterized as tenuous, the court may only
assert limited jurisdiction3 over the defendant.
1. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945). The United States
Supreme Court stated that constitutional due process in jurisidiction cases:
depend[s] ... upon the quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and
orderly administration of the laws which it was the purpose of the due process clause
to insure. That clause does not contemplate that a state may make binding a judg-
ment in personam against an individual or corporate defendant with which the state
has no contacts, ties, or relations.
Id. Cf. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877); Minnesota Commercial Ass'n v. Benn, 261 U.S.
140 (1922).
2. A foreign component manufacturer for the purposes of this Comment is a foreign
corporation who manufactures component parts for sale to various non-United States based
companies.
3. A forum state may only assert personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant if
the assertion comports with the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Interna-
tional Shoe, 326 U.S. 310. The due process clause states: "nor shall any state deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
To guarantee compliance with the clause, a non-resident defendant must have certain contacts
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The court has two approaches 4 in determining whether the man-
ufacturer is amenable to jurisdiction in the forum. However, the cru-
cial requirement remains that the defendant have certain minimum
contacts5 with that forum in order to constitutionally assert jurisdic-
tion. Traditionally, a court's inquiry into the defendant's ties has
been labeled as the "minimum contacts" analysis.
6
The United States Supreme Court recently addressed the mini-
mum contacts analysis in the context of multi-national product manu-
facturers in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court.7 The Court's
various opinions illustrate the contrasting philosophies as to whether
the constitutional due process requirement should apply to a non-resi-
dent defendant: (1) who possesses insufficient contacts with the fo-
rum; or (2) who possesses insufficient contacts but will not be
unreasonably burdened by defending in that forum. In light of the
Asahi opinions, the Supreme Court apparently has enough Justices
with the forum seeking to assert jurisdiction. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316. The court
may assert either general or specific jurisdiction over the defendant, depending on how exten-
sive the defendant's contacts are. Id. at 317-18.
This Comment centers on limited or specific personal jurisdiction rather than general
jurisdiction. The court asserts general jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant when the
defendant's contacts with the forum state are extensive enough to hold the defendant account-
able for any cause of action which occurs in the forum. Id. at 318.
However, in the specific personal jurisdiction cases, the defendant does not possess such
pervasive contacts with the forum state. Id. Therefore, for a court to constitutionally assert
jurisdiction over the non-resident defendant, the defendant must have "minimum contacts"
with that forum state. Id. at 316.
4. One view is that constitutional due process requires a defendant to possess contacts
with the forum state in order to be subject to that state's jurisdiction. E.g., Asahi Metal Indus.
Co. v. Superior Court, 107 S. Ct. 1026 (1987) (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion); World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 287 (1980) (White, J. majority opinion); see also
Ottonello, California's Convenience-Oriented Approach to Personal Jurisdiction: A Critical Re-
view, 13 LINCOLN L. REV. 21 (1982); Sonenshein, The Error of a Balancing Approach to the
Due Process Determination of Jursidiction over the Person, 59 TEMP. L.Q. 47 (1986).
The other position applies the due process concerns to the inconveniences the defendant
will face by defending in the forum. E.g., World- Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 299 (Brennan,
J. dissenting); Asahi Metal Indus., 107 S. Ct. at 1038 (Stevens, J. concurring); see also Wein-
traub, Due Process Limitations on the Personal Jurisdiction of State Courts: Time for Change,
63 ORE. L. REV. 485 (1984); Jay, "Minimum Contacts" as a Unified Theory of Personal Juris-
diction: A Reappraisal, 59 N.C.L. REV. 429 (1981).
5. International Shoe established a requirement that the defendant possess minimum
contacts with the forum state since the defendant, who enjoys the privilege of conducting
business in that state, also carries the reciprocal obligation of defending in that forum. Inter-
national Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319.
6. Id. The courts are concerned with ties possessed by the defendant in relation to the
forum state. See infra text accompanying notes 206-12. Cf Terez, The Misguided Helicopteros
Case: Confusion in the Courts over Contacts, 37 BAYLOR L. REV. 842 (1985).
7. 107 S. Ct. 1026 (1987).
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who would votes to hale a foreign component manufacturer into a
forum state where it does not intentionally direct its activities as long
as the burden of defending in the forum state is reasonable to the
defendant.9
An emphasis on the reasonableness to the defendant in defending
in the forum is echoed by some trial courts in the minimum contacts
analysis. These lower court decisions do not presently focus on the
"quality and nature"10 of the defendant's conduct in the forum state.
Instead, some courts have fashioned an analysis where the crucial in-
quiry is whether it is foreseeable that the defendant's product will end
up in the forum state."' Other commentators, however, advocate the
assertion of jurisdiction on the grounds that it is reasonable to all the
parties to do so.
1 2
In addition to a foreign defendant's due process concerns, prag-
matic considerations exist in light of today's economy. 13 Whether the
court will exercise jurisdiction over a foreign component manufac-
turer may implicate foreign trade policy as well.14 The component
manufacturer will have to structure its future business relationships to
avoid being haled into distant forums when dealing with those forum
states which broadly assert jurisdiction.
1 5
8. Though all the Justices found that the assertion of jurisdiction over Asahi would be
unreasonable, Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun found jurisdiction to be un-
reasonable irrespective of whether Asahi had purposefully availed itself of the forum. See infra
text accompanying notes 130-35. Furthermore, Justice Stevens adds the fifth vote to compose
a majority of the Court who would be willing to base jurisdiction on a reasonableness standard
alone. See infra text accompanying notes 136-39. Justice Stevens stated that "an examination
of minimum contacts is not always necessary to determine whether a state court's assertion of
personal jurisdiction is constitutional." Asahi, 107 S. Ct. at 1038. (Stevens, J., concurring).
9. See also Charles Gendler & Co. v. Telecom Equip. Corp., 102 N.J. 460, 508 A.2d
1127 (1986) (international corporation could constitutionally be subject to forum state's juris-
diction in a breach of warranty action if corporation knew or reasonably should have known
its product would be distributed for sale in forum state). But see Chung v. Nana Dev. Corp.,
783 F.2d 1124 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 431 (1986) (foreign defendant's knowledge
that its product's ultimate destination in forum state was immaterial when defendant did not
affirmatively establish ties with forum state).
10. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
11. See, e.g., Hedrick v. Daiko Shoji, 715 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1983).
12. See infra text accompanying notes 216-20.
13. In 1986, the United States trade deficit hit a record 140.57 billion dollars. L.A.
Times, Mar. 18, 1987, § IV, at 3, col. 4. The amount of foreign merchandise entering into the
United States may signal an increase in lawsuits against the foreign manufacturers in products
liability actions.
14. See infra Part IV of text.
15. For example, if a foreign corporate manufacturer knows that the forum state will
liberally find that the defendant has sufficient minimum contacts, the defendant will either
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This Comment addresses both the constitutional and economic
concerns. The first portion examines the United States Supreme
Court's limited personal jurisdiction standard by reviewing World-
Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson 16 and its subsequent refinement in Bur-
ger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz.17 The next section of this Comment ana-
lyzes the Asahi Metal IndustryIs case in both the California Supreme
Court and the United States Supreme Court. In particular, this Com-
ment examines the Supreme Court's retraction of California's broad
application (of limited personal jurisdiction), while neglecting to im-
plement a clearly defined analysis.' 9 The third section examines the
economic trade implications which result from the application of this
unclear standard to foreign corporations. Finally, this Comment sug-
gests an analysis which returns to the primary constitutional concern
of the minimum contacts inquiry: "[to protect] the defendant against
the burdens of litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum" when the
defendant lacks sufficient ties with the forum state.
20
tailor its dealings to avoid this forum or it will increase its costs to the consumers of that forum
to cover added insurance costs. Weinberg, The Helicopter Case and the Jurisprudence of Juris-
diction, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 913, 929 (1985).
16. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
17. 471 U.S. 462 (1985). Though Burger King deals with a contract dispute as opposed
to a products liability claim, as in World- Wide Volkswagen, the Supreme Court illustrated
pertinent principles of the due process analysis which should override this distinction. See
generally Sonenshein, supra note 4. Professor Sonenshein's position is based on the defendant's
constitutional due process concerns. Id. at 48. Therefore, whether the plaintiff's cause of
action arises in tort or contract has nothing to do with creating a defendant's minimum con-
tacts with the forum state. But see Terez, supra note 6, at 935-41.
18. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 39 Cal. 3d 35, 702 P.2d 543, 216 Cal.
Rptr. 385 (1985), cert. granted, 475 U.S. 1044 (1986) (No. 85-693, 1986 Term), argued, Oct. 5,
rev'd, 107 S. Ct. 1026 (1987).
19. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 107 S. Ct. 1026 (1987). The Supreme
Court unanimously held Asahi could not be subject to California's jurisdiction. Id. However,
the decision was marked by three opinions. Justice O'Connor, for the plurality, required a
defendant to have purposefully availed itself of the forum. See infra text accompanying notes
117-24. Justice Brennan's separate opinion focused on the reasonableness of asserting jurisdic-
tion over Asahi and reaffirmed a "foreseeability" approach to jurisdiction. See infra text ac-
companying notes 130-34. Justice Stevens' opinion centered on the actual valve itself in
determining jurisdiction. See infra text accompanying notes 136-39.
20. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292-94 (1980). Justice
White was also concerned "that the [s]tates, through their courts, do not reach out beyond the
limits imposed on them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal system." Id. How-
ever, one commentator has suggested that this federalism concern is no longer an appropriate
interest in the analysis. Hay, Refining Personal Jurisdiction in the United States, 35 INT'L &
COMp. L.Q. 32, 34 (1986). Another scholar finds federalism concerns immaterial in relation to
the due process concerns in cases involving domestic defendants, but distinguishes cases in-
volving international defendants. Weinberg, supra note 15, at 924-25.
Additionally, in Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee,
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II. RECENT HISTORY OF SPECIFIC PERSONAL JURISDICTION 2 1
A. Specific Jurisdiction
Chief Justice Stone's majority opinion in International Shoe Co.
v. Washington 22 specified four situations where the court has to assess
the defendant's contacts in order to assert personal jurisdiction:23
(1) when the defendant's continuous and systematic activity created
plaintiff's cause of action;24 (2) when the defendant's isolated activi-
ties in the forum are insufficient to render him accountable when the
cause of action is unrelated to that activity;25 (3) when the defend-
ant's activity may be so pervasive within the forum as to make the
defendant amenable to suit even though the cause of action does not
arise out of that activity;26 and (4) when the defendant's activities are
sporadic or isolated, yet the plaintiff's cause of action arises out of
such activity so that the defendant may nevertheless be amenable to
suit.
27
The United States Supreme Court further refined the four situa-
tions in Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall.28 Essen-
tially, the Court described International Shoe's third category as
456 U.S. 694 (1982), Justice White stated in the majority opinion that the due process clause
"is the only source of the personal jurisdiction requirement and the Clause itself makes no
mention of federalism concerns." Id. at 703 n.10. See generally Lewis, The Three Deaths of
"State Sovereignty" and the Curse of Abstraction in the Jurisprudence of Personal Jurisdiction,
58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 699 (1982); Comment, Federalism, Due Process, and Minimum
Contacts: World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1341 (1980).
21. This Comment focuses on the minimum contacts analysis applied by the courts from
1980 to the present. The test presently being applied uses the standards rooted in the 1980
Supreme Court World-Wide Volkswagen decision. See generally Annotation, Products
Liability: In Personam Jurisdiction over Nonresident Manufacturers or Sellers under "Long-
Arm" Statutes, 19 A.L.R.3d 13 (1968).
22. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
23. Id. at 317-18.
24. Id. at 317; see, e.g., International Shoe, 326 U.S. 310 (where non-resident defendant's
extensive business gave rise to litigation because of defendant's failure to comply with state
unemployment fund).
25. Id.; see, e.g., Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958) (where Florida forum had no
jurisdiction over trustee Delaware corporation when settlor created a Delaware trust and set-
tlor's will was probated under Florida law).
26. Id. at 318; see, e.g., Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952)
(where forum state was allowed to assert jurisdiction over foreign corporation even though the
cause of action was not related to defendant's contacts because corporation's contacts in state
were so extensive).
27. Id. at 318; see, e.g., McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) (where
forum state allowed jurisdiction over corporation whose sole contact was insurance policy
issued to forum resident who sued on policy).
28. 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
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"general" jurisdiction29 and the fourth situation as "specific" jurisdic-
tion.30 One commentator has illustrated the significance of this dis-
tinction. 31  He believes that specific jurisdiction assesses the
defendant's minimum contacts,32 while general jurisdiction analyzes
the defendant's systematic and continuous contacts.
33
Later United States Supreme Court decisions modified the spe-
cific jurisdiction, minimal contacts analysis. The Court has grappled
with finding just how minimum the defendant's contacts may be to
warrant the assertion of jurisdiction. Specifically, the United States
Supreme Court has examined whether a defendant's foreseeability of
its product's presence in the forum would make the defendant amena-
ble to suit in that forum. 34 The Court later re-emphasized that the
jurisdictional analysis must assess the defendant's intentional, forum-
directed activity. 35
B. World-Wide Volkswagen: The Role of Foreseeability in the
Minimum Contacts Analysis
In a products liability action where the plaintiffs were injured
while driving through Oklahoma, the Oklahoma Supreme Court as-
serted specific personal jurisdiction over the non-resident regional au-
tomobile distributor.
3 6
In reversing the Oklahoma Supreme Court, the United States
Supreme Court majority and dissenting opinions illustrate the differ-
ing views regarding where the minimum contacts focus should be in
relation to the defendant's interests.37 On one hand, Justice White's
majority opinion stated that the International Shoe Co. v. Washing-
ton 38 concepts of "fair play"3 9 and "substantial justice" 4 of haling the
29. Id. at 414 n.9; see also von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Sug-
gested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1136 (1966).
30. Id. at 414 n.8; see also von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 29, at 1136.
31. Note, Specific and General Jurisdiction-the Reshuffling of the Minimum Contacts
Analysis, 59 TUL. L. REV. 826, 833 (1985).
32. Id. at 833; Furthermore, the Helicopteros opinion also required that the plaintiff's
cause of action arose out of, rather than related to the defendant's minimum contacts.
Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414.
33. Note, supra note 31, at 833.
34. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); see infra text ac-
companying notes 45-53.
35. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985); see infra text accompanying
notes 69-77.
36. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 286.
37. See supra note 4.
38. 326 U.S. at 317.
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defendant into the forum state should apply to the non-resident de-
fendant's contacts with the forum state41 in asserting specific personal
jurisdiction. 42 On the other hand, Justice Brennan's dissent 43 illus-
trated a second approach. He stated that International Shoe's fairness
notions apply to the fairness a defendant experiences in defending a
suit in the forum state.44
1. The Majority Opinion
In Justice White's minimum contacts analysis, it was insignifi-
cant that a defendant could foresee its product arriving in the fo-
rum.45 The defendant can reasonably-and fairly-expect to be haled
into that forum, under Justice White's approach, only when the de-
fendant's intentionally directed activities caused injury there.46 Fore-
seeability, then, is relevant to the minimum contacts analysis only to
the extent that the defendant directed its activities at the forum. Jus-
tice White's analysis did not center on a defendant's knowledge that it
may be haled into the forum simply because it was aware its product
had been introduced into the forum by a third party's unilateral
acts.47 Rather, Justice White stressed that once the defendant ex-
pected sales in the forum due to its product's entrance into the busi-
ness world's stream of commerce, 48 then the defendant may logically
conclude that it may be haled into that forum state should the prod-
uct fail.
Additionally, Justice White discussed whether the defendant's
privileges and benefits from the forum state were sufficient contacts.
49
Where these benefits are merely economic, such benefits in themselves
do not confer jurisdiction as long as the defendant possesses no other
39. Id. at 316. Ottonello has attributed Justice Stone's International Shoe requirements to
Judge Learned Hand in Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, 45 F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 1930). Ottonello
believes Judge Hand took the position that once a defendant had minimum contacts with the
forum, that defendant's due process rights were not implicated by defending in that forum.
Ottonello, supra note 4, at 21, 30.
40. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
41. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980).
42. See supra note 3.
43. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 299.
44. Id. at 300-01.
45. Id. at 295-97.
46. Id. at 297.
47. Id. at 298.
48. Id. at 297-98.
49. Id. at 299.
1988]
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"constitutionally cognizable contact with that [s]tate." °  Clearly, a
defendant would need to have some intentional contact with the fo-
rum state other than "marginal revenues" 51 resulting from the prod-
uct's entrance into the stream of commerce. 52 Because the defendant
in World-Wide Volkswagen lacked the expectation that its product
would be purchased in Oklahoma and, at best, received only marginal
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. The minimum contacts analysis as applied to component manufacturers is frequently
termed the "stream of commerce" approach. The theory was introduced in Gray v. American
Radiator & Sanitary Corp., 22 11. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961) which held that a defendant
who "delivers its products into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they will be
purchased in the forum [s]tate" may constitutionally be subject to the forum state's jurisdic-
tion. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 298.
The stream of commerce theory has been justified as follows:
a manufacturer may be held amenable to process in a forum in which its products are
sold, even if the products were sold indirectly through importers or distributors with
independent sales and marketing schemes. Courts have found the assumption of ju-
risdiction in these cases to be consistent with the due process requirements... [since]
by increasing the distribution of its products through indirect sales within the forum,
a manufacturer benefits legally from the protection provided by the laws of the forum
state for its products, as well as economically from indirect sales to forum residents
.... [A] manufacturer [may not] . . . insulate itself from the reach of the forum
state's long-arm rule by using an intermediary or by professing ignorance of the ulti-
mate destination of its products.
DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, 654 F.2d 280, 285 (3d Cir. 1981).
This Comment argues against any type of mechanical test. Rather, the heart of the juris-
dictional question should look to the intentional, forum-directed activity of the defendant. In
fact, the stream of commerce test essentially is equated, by the decisions discussed herein, with
the defendant's mere knowledge that its product eventually would reach the forum. See
Dalmau Rodriguez v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 781 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1986). The court rejected the
stream of commerce test when defendant sold a helicopter to another bidder and the product
reached the forum. The court held that knowledge of the product's ultimate destination was
not the test; rather, the test was the purposeful act of the defendant. Id. at 15. But see Oswalt
v. Scripto, Inc., 616 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1980) (where Japanese manufacturer was subject to
jurisdiction when it delivered millions of lighters to an exclusive distributor for sale in the
United States). Id. at 199-200; Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. Construzioni Aeronautiche Giovanni
Agusta, S.P.A. and S.N.F.A., 553 F. Supp. 328 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (where foreign corporation
was subject to jurisdiction when it designed component part specifically for sale in the United
States).
The stream of commerce theory is troublesome because as one scholar has recognized,
"[u]nfortunately, the courts have not defined the outer limits of jurisdiction over component
part manufacturers in a multiple component part scenario." Note, Asahi Metal Industry Co. v.
Superior Court: Minimum Contacts in California Become Minimal, 22 WILLAMETrE L. REV.
589, 600 (1986).
Conceptually, the situation in Asahi can be distinguished from a "typical" stream of com-
merce case. In World- Wide Volkswagen, the car manufacturer's product was the "waterfall"
that started the stream. In that case, jurisdiction over the defendant was proper. World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 298 (1980). However, in Asahi, the foreign
manufacturer's valve was a "rock tossed into the stream" by a third party, who was another
foreign manufacturer.
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revenues from the forum state, the Court declined to assert jurisdic-
tion.53 Under Justice White's view, International Shoe's fairness no-
tions could only be satisfied when the defendant intentionally acted
toward the forum state.
2. The Dissenters
a. Justice Brennan's balancing analysis
Justice Brennan's dissent balanced the interests of the parties to
determine whether jurisdiction over the defendant was proper.54 His
discussion of the fairness factors to the defendant5 5 did not apply to
the forum's assertion of jurisdiction over a defendant who lacked con-
tacts. Rather, fairness to a defendant revolved around the extent the
defendant was inconvenienced by defending in the forum state.56 Jus-
tice Brennan takes a different approach from the majority opinion,
since Justice Brennan did not focus on the defendant's intentional,
forum-directed activity.
57
Essentially, Justice Brennan advocated a sliding scale approach.
For example, when the defendant possessed minimal contacts with
the forum, but would not be unreasonably inconvenienced by defend-
ing in the forum state, jurisdiction over that defendant was justified. 58
However, Justice Brennan included an undefined caveat which re-
quired that the burdens on the defendant "must be of constitutional
dimension."59
In World-Wide Volkswagen, Justice Brennan classified the de-
fendant's purposeful activity in the Oklahoma forum as the sale of an
automobile in New York.6° He felt the automobile's transitory nature
53. The defendants in World- Wide Volkswagen contesting the forum state's jurisdiction
were the regional distributor and retailer. Plaintiffs also named the manufacturer and im-
porter, however, these defendants did not contest jurisdiction based on the "stream of com-
merce" theory. Id. at 298. See generally Hay, Judicial Jurisdiction over Foreign-Country
Corporate Defendants-Comments on Recent Case Law, 63 ORE. L. REV. 431, 435-44 (1984).
See also infra notes 157-60 and accompanying text.
54. World- Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 299-300 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
55. See supra notes 39-40.
56. . World- Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 300 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 301.
59. Id.; Justice Brennan does not specify what composes a "constitutional dimension."
However, he does say that it relates to the "mobility of the defendant's defense" even though
"it would not be sensible to make the constitutional rule turn solely on the number of miles the
defendant must travel to the courtroom." Id.
60. Id. at 306.
1988]
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was indicative of the defendant's intent to reach distant forums. 61
Therefore, Justice Brennan concluded that the defendant possessed
sufficient contacts with the Oklahoma forum, and, since defending in
Oklahoma was not unduly burdensome, jurisdiction was reasonable. 62
b. Justices Marshall and Blackmun: focus on the chattel
Both Justices Marshall and Blackmun agreed with the majority
that jurisdiction should be based on a defendant's "deliberate and
purposeful" activity. 63 However, they departed from the majority
view by analyzing the chattel itself (i.e., the car).64 They found that
the automobile's very nature made it reasonable for the defendants to
anticipate their products' presence in the forum state.65 Because of
the automobile's transitory nature, the Justices found that the defend-
ants intentionally directed activity toward the Oklahoma forum.66
The defendants had every reason to expect to be haled into Oklahoma
since their car sales constituted purposeful availment of the
Oklahoma forum.67
C. Burger King: Emphasis on the Defendant's Purposefully
Directed Activities
While the majority in World- Wide Volkswagen clarified that the
role of foreseeability in the minimum contacts analysis is a conclusion
rather than an assessment of the defendant's intentional conduct, Jus-
tice Brennan's majority opinion in Burger King68 defined the pur-
poseful availment test.69 His opinion focused on the extent to which
61. Id.
62. Id. Justice Brennan also characterized the defendant's contacts as "sufficiently signif-
icant" because of Oklahoma's interest in the action. Id. at 307. Additionally, he found the
assertion of jurisdiction to be "fair and reasonable." Id.
63. Id. at 314 (Marshall, J. & Blackmun, J., dissenting).
64. Id.; see also id. at 318, (Blackmun, J., dissenting) where a crucial factor in the inquiry
was the instrumentality under consideration.
65. Id. at 314-15 (Marshall, J. & Blackmun, J., dissenting).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 315.
68. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985). The majority opinion in
World- Wide Volkswagen consisted of Justices White, Stewart, Powell, Rehnquist, Stevens, and
Chief Justice Burger. The dissenters were Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun. In Bur-
ger King, Justices White and Stevens filed a dissent.
The dissenters' analysis of defendant Rudzewicz' minimum contacts centered on the con-
tract, similar to World- Wide Volkswagen's dissenters. Justices Marshall and Blackmun fo-
cused on the car's presence. See supra note 64.
69. See supra note 5.
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the defendant intentionally directed itself toward the forum state.
Burger King involved the fast-food chain's breach of contract 70 suit in
Florida against a non-resident franchisee, Rudzewicz, a Michigan res-
ident. The Court determined that the Florida forum could properly
assert jurisdiction over Rudzewicz based on Rudzewicz' affirmative
forum-directed conduct of contracting with Burger King, the Florida-
based corporation. 71
Justice Brennan further extended World- Wide Volkswagen juris-
dictional principles by focusing on the defendant's intentional forum-
directed activity72 and not the independent actions of a third party.7 3
He did not consider Rudzewicz' forum-related contacts which were
"random," "fortuitous," or "attenuated.'74 However, Justice Bren-
nan would permit the assertion of jurisdiction over the defendant
whose connection with the forum state was a result of the defendant's
own intentional activities. 75 Justice Brennan's analysis required a de-
fendant to affirmatively reach out beyond his own state and establish
ties with the forum state.76
At a minimum then, the Burger King opinion initially required
the defendant to intentionally direct his activities toward the forum
state.77 After making this determination, the second consideration in
Justice Brennan's due process analysis involved the concept of balanc-
ing each party's interests. This balancing was also introduced in Jus-
tice Brennan's World-Wide Volkswagen dissent.78 Thus, by meshing
World- Wide Volkswagen's balancing concept with Burger King's pur-
70. See supra note 17. Additionally, Burger King and Rudzewicz' franchise agreement
stated it would be governed by Florida laws. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,
466 (1985).
71. 471 U.S. at 481.
72. The majority in World- Wide Volkswagen did not elaborate on what would constitute
purposefully availing conduct. Rather, they refined the role of foreseeability in the analysis.
Id.
73. Id. at 475 (citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408
(1984)).
74. Id. at 475 (quoting Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, 465 U.S. 770 (1984) (emphasis
added).
75. Id. at 476 (citing McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222-23 (1957).
76. This analysis can be analogized to the tort distinctions between intentional and negli-
gent conduct. See infra text accompanying notes 83-87. In both Burger King and World- Wide
Volkswagen, the majority opinions specified a standard where the defendant intentionally es-
tablished ties with the forum state. Foreseeability, involving negligence standards, was re-
jected as the minimum contacts test. See also Terez supra note 6, at 936; infra text
accompanying notes 213-15.
77. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985).
78. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 299 (1980).
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poseful availment requirement, jurisdiction over the defendant would
be constitutional if the defendant had insignificant contacts with the
forum state, but the burden of defending in that forum was slight. 79
In addition, both the forum state and plaintiff must possess compel-
ling interests to adjudicate the matter in the forum state.80
III. THE MINIMUM CONTACTS ANALYSIS AFTER BURGER KING
A. Foreseeability as a "Negligence" Standard
From Burger King, personal jurisdiction is determined in part by
the defendant's purposeful conduct directed toward the forum state.
Activities which typically constitute such purposeful activity are es-
tablishing offices 8' or maintaining agents82 in the forum state. Such
activity is illustrative of a non-resident defendant's intent to conduct
and solicit business in the forum.
On the other hand, according to World- Wide Volkswagen, if the
defendant's activities in the forum state consist only of the defendant's
awareness that his product could conceivably reach the forum, this
awareness would be insufficient to meet the due process requirement.
In analyzing whether the defendant purposefully availed itself of the
forum state or merely was aware its product may be in the forum
state, one may analogize to the tort concepts of intentional and negli-
gent conduct. Intentional acts consist of the defendant's own con-
sciousness that his actions will probably effectuate certain
consequences. 83 Negligent conduct, in contrast, consists only of a de-
fendant's knowledge that his activity may cause a risk of harm to
another.84
This analogy also applies to the the minimum contacts analysis.
The United States Supreme Court cases which have allowed a forum
79. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476-77.
80. Id. But see infra text accompanying notes 231-36.
81. United States v. Toyota Motor Co., 561 F. Supp. 354 (C.D. Cal. 1983). A foreign
corporation was subject to jurisdiction when the corporation's wholly-owned subsidiary, a Cal-
ifornia corporation, was located in the forum state.
82. Hicks v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., 452 F. Supp. 130 (M.D. Pa. 1978) (where Japanese
corporation's sales of its product to their exclusive sales agent for the United States constituted
purposeful availment of the forum).
83. PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 8, at 35-36 (W. Keeton, 5th ed.
1984).
84. Id. Prosser and Keeton find the distinction between intentional and negligent con-
duct to be one of degree. Id. Essentially, the greater the defendant's certainty that specific
consequences will occur, the greater responsibility the courts impose on him. Id. at 37. This
Comment argues for the same type of analysis in the jurisdictional context.
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state to assert jurisdiction over a defendant have done so based on the
defendant's intentionally directed conduct toward the forum state. 5
In those cases the defendants acted with the belief that their conduct
in the forum, such as establishing sales offices, would produce certain
results, such as sales in the forum.
s6
However, in cases where the defendant simply conducted itself
with knowledge that its actions might produce risks to others, the
Court has not allowed the forum to assert jurisdiction based on the
defendant's foreseeability of harm alone.8 7 Therefore, in light of the
Supreme Court's interpretations of a defendant's activities in the fo-
rum state, a defendant must "intentionally," rather than "negli-
gently," act in the forum state for jurisdiction to be constitutionally
permissible.
B. "Foreseeability" Remains Crucial to Minimum Contacts: The
Example of Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court8
In Asahi Metal Industry, the plaintiffs, who were injured in a mo-
torcycle accident, brought a products liability action in a California
state court against the Taiwanese tire-tube manufacturer of the mo-
torcycle tire. Cheng Shin Rubber Industrial Co., Ltd. (Cheng Shin),
the Taiwanese manufacturer, did not contest California's assertion of
jurisdiction. Rather, it sought indemnification from Asahi Metal In-
dustry Co., Ltd. (Asahi), the Japanese manufacturer of the tire-tube
valve assembly.
8 9
Cheng Shin alleged that Asahi's California contacts arose from
Asahi's business transactions in Taiwan with Cheng Shin because
Cheng Shin dealt directly with California. a0 Between 1978 and 1982,
85. E.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985); McGee v. International
Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, 465 U.S. 770 (1984).
86. E.g., Bean Dredging Corp. v. Dredge Technology Corp., 744 F.2d 1081 (5th Cir.
1984) where defendant was subject to jurisdiction when it manufactured thousands of compo-
nents and injected them into the stream of commerce. The court inferred that defendant in-
tended to reach as broad a market as possible. Id. at 1083. But see Hedrick, 715 F.2d 1355.
87. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); see, e.g., Deiames
v. Magnificence Carriers, 654 F.2d 280 (3d Cir. 1981) where defendant's ability to foresee that
its product might end up in forum is insufficient alone to create a reasonable expectation that it
may be haled to the forum; Humble v. Toyota Motor Co., 727 F.2d 709 (8th Cir. 1984) where
Japanese manufacturer was not subject to jurisdiction when it manufactured components in
Japan for sale in Japan to a United States corporation and all distribution and marketing was
done without the Japanese manufacturer's involvement.
88. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 107 S. Ct. 1026 (1987).
89. Id. at 1029.
90. Id. at 1030.
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Asahi sold 1,350,000 component parts to Cheng Shin, and twenty per-
cent of Cheng Shin's United States sales were to California.9'
1. Foreseeability, Minimum Contacts, and the
California Supreme Court
The appellate court granted Asahi's motion to quash service of
summons based on these contacts. 92 Cheng Shin appealed to the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court which reversed the appellate court and affirmed
the trial court's decision to assert limited personal jurisdiction over
Asahi.93
a. the California Supreme Court majority opinion
Chief Justice Bird extensively summarized the minimum con-
tacts standards as developed in World-Wide Volkswagen. She ac-
knowledged that the personal jurisdiction analysis "is 'not mechanical
or quantitative,' but depends upon the 'quality and nature' of defend-
ant's activities within the [s]tate. ' '94 In applying this test, the Chief
Justice focused on the interrelationship between the defendant, plain-
tiff, and the forum state.
95
Moreover, Chief Justice Bird recognized that the recent trend in
the minimum contacts analysis is toward liberalization. 96 However,
the minimum contacts test, while more liberal in application, is still
subject to certain limitations.97 The Chief Justice characterized these
limitations as: (1) to protect the defendant from unreasonable hard-
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1031.
94. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 39 Cal. 3d 35, 42, 702 P.2d 543, 545, 216
Cal. Rptr. 385, 387 (1985) (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319
(1945)).
95. Id. at 42, 702 P.2d at 545, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 388 (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S.
186, 204 (1977)). But see Sonenshein supra note 4, at 48; infra Part V of text.
96. Asahi Metal Indus., 39 Cal. 3d at 43, 702 P.2d at 546, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 388. Chief
Justice Bird stated:
In part this is attributable to the fundamental transformation of our national econ-
omy over the years. Today many commercial transactions touch two or more
[s]tates and may involve parties separated by the full continent. With this increasing
nationalization of commerce has come a great increase in the amount of business
conducted by mail across state lines. At the same time modern transportation and
communication have made it much less burdensome for a party used to defend him-
self in a State where he engages in economic activity.
Id. at 43, 702 P.2d at 546, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 388 (quoting McGee v. International Life Ins. Co.,
355 U.S. 220, 222-23 (1957)).
97. Id., 702 P.2d at 546, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 388.
[Vol. 10: 361
Specific Personal Jurisdiction
ships from defending in distant forums; and (2) to limit the forum
state in its sovereign capacity to only assert jurisdiction over defend-
ants who possess ties with the sovereign. 9 Finally, she recognized
that the defendant must have conducted itself with the forum state so
that the defendant received "benefits and protections" 99 from the fo-
rum state. '0 0
Both Cheng Shin and Asahi relied on World-Wide Volkswagen.
Cheng Shin argued that World- Wide Volkswagen controlled and con-
ferred jurisdiction over Asahi since Asahi manufactured the compo-
nent valve assembly °10 and entered it into the stream of commerce. 102
Conversely, Asahi reasoned that California lacked jurisdiction based
on World-Wide Volkswagen's definition of foreseeability in the mini-
mum contacts analysis.103
The majority rejected Asahi's interpretation of World-Wide
Volkswagen. Chief Justice Bird distinguished World-Wide Volk-
swagen from Asahi's situation because the car in World-Wide Volk-
swagen reached the forum state by the consumer-plaintiff driving it
there. Chief Justice Bird characterized the activity in World-Wide
Volkswagen as "fortuitous."'04 In contrast, in Asahi Metal Industry,
the manufacturer's valve assembly entered the California forum in the
stream of commerce. Chief Justice Bird stated that according to
World-Wide Volkswagen, California's assertion of jurisdiction over
Asahi was justified. The court reasoned that Asahi purposefully
availed itself of the California forum when it knew its valve sales to
Cheng Shin would be assembled in tubes for sale in California.
0 5
Furthermore, Chief Justice Bird found Asahi conducted "sub-
stantial" business in the California forum via Asahi's sales to Cheng
98. Id. at 43, 702 P.2d at 546, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 388 (citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S.
235, 251 (1958)); see also supra note 20.
99. See supra note 5.
100. Asahi Metal Indus., 39 Cal. 3d at 43, 702 P.2d at 546, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 388 (citing
Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253).
101. Id. at 47, 702 P.2d at 549, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 391.
102. See supra note 52.
103. Asahi Metal Indus., 39 Cal. 3d at 47, 702 P.2d at 549, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 391.
104. Id., 702 P.2d at 549, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 391.
105. Id. at 48, 702 P.2d at 550, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 392. Chief Justice Bird stated, "the
distinction between the foreseeability of use in the forum and the expectation of sale in the
forum is critical to the rationale in World-Wide Volkswagen." Id., 702 P.2d at 549 n.3, 216
Cal. Rptr. at 391 n.3. However, Chief Justice Bird classified Asahi's conduct as the valve's
"foreseeable use in the forum" and not as an expectation of sale. Id., 702 P.2d at 550, 216 Cal.
Rptr. at 392.
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Shin.10 6 The court found Asahi's economic benefits likewise to be
"substantial."' 0 7 Since Asahi enjoyed economic benefits from its indi-
rect business with California, the California Supreme Court applied
the World-Wide Volkswagen "foreseeability-of-the-product's-pres-
ence" discussion10 8 to Asahi.
b. the dissenting opinion
Justice Lucas adhered to Asahi's interpretation of World-Wide
Volkswagen that Asahi cannot constitutionally be haled into the Cali-
fornia forum when Asahi's contact with that forum was mere knowl-
edge that its component part may eventually reach that forum. 109
Justice Lucas was not persuaded that Cheng Shin met its burden of
proof that Asahi was subject to California's jurisdiction because
Cheng Shin produced "no evidence ... that Asahi intended to serve
the California market indirectly."' 10
Moreover, Justice Lucas was not convinced that Asahi even re-
ceived a substantial economic benefit from its indirect sales to Califor-
nia through Cheng Shin. He found that Asahi's one quarter of one
percent (0.25%) in revenue from Cheng Shin's California's sales did
not constitute purposefully availing activity.1 Justice Lucas con-
cluded, "Asahi at best foresaw that some [of its] valves would be sold
in California but it in no way purposefully availed itself of the privi-
lege of conducting business in California, nor did it exert any effort to
106. Id., 702 P.2d at 549, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 392. The Chief Justice did concede the fact
Asahi possessed no offices, agents, or property in California and did not actually solicit Cali-
fornia's business. Id., 702 P.2d at 549, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 392.
107. Id., 702 P.2d at 550, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 392. The majority refers this finding to the
following figures: of Asahi's 1,350,000 sales to Cheng Shin in a four year period, 1.24% of
Asahi's income in 1981 and .44% of its gross income in 1982 were represented by its sales to
the Taiwanese manufacturer. Moreover, 22% of the "97 Japanese or Taiwanese tubes offered
for sale .. .contained Asahi valve assemblies." Id. at 41 n.1, 702 P.2d at 545 n.1, 216 Cal.
Rptr. at 387 n.1.
108. See supra text accompanying notes 46-50.
109. Asahi Metal Indus, 39 Cal. 3d at 54-55, 702 P.2d at 554, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 396.
110. Id. at 54, 702 P.2d at 554, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 396.
111. Id. "Cheng Shin presented evidence that other tire manufacturers sell tires in Cali-
fornia that incorporate Asahi valves but there is no indication of the number of such tires or
what percentage of Asahi's total revenues are represented by such tires." Id. at 54-55, 702
P.2d at 554, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 396.
The lack of these actual figures seriously clouds the extent Asahi received economic bene-
fit. Neither the majority nor dissenting opinions can persuasively say jurisdiction over Asahi




serve the California market." 112
2. Asahi in the United States Supreme Court
a. the unanimous result based on different rationales
The United States Supreme Court unanimously found that Asahi
could not be subject to specific personal jurisdiction in the California
forum.' 3 However, the Court was markedly split in determining why
Asahi could not constitutionally be haled into a California court. The
separate theories involved the conflict apparent from the World-Wide
Volkswagen opinions." 4 Presently, the Supreme Court is still split on
whether to accord the jurisdictional fairness' 15 factors: (1) when the
non-resident defendant possesses insufficient contacts with the forum;
or (2) when the non-resident defendant possesses insufficient contacts
with the forum, but will not be tremendously burdened by defending
in the forum. 116
b. Justice O'Connor's purposeful availment requirement
Writing for the plurality, 17 Justice O'Connor found that Asahi
could not be haled into the California forum because Asahi lacked
forum-directed purposeful conduct." 8 Justice O'Connor recognized
that to comport with due process,' 9 the defendant must have mini-
mum contacts with the forum state. 20 In Justice O'Connor's opinion,
to assert jurisdiction over a defendant who did not intentionally direct
its activities toward the forum would be unconstitutional.' 2'
Asahi must have had intentional forum-directed activities which
would constitute purposeful availment of the California forum in or-
der for jurisdiction to be proper. Justice O'Connor emphasized that
the defendant's awareness that its product would end up in the forum
does not constitute the purposeful availment requirement of Interna-
tional Shoe Co. 122 Justice O'Connor rejected the argument that
112. Id. at 55, 702 P.2d at 554, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 396 (emphasis added).
113. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 107 S. Ct. 1031 (1987).
114. See supra text accompanying notes 37-44.
115. See supra notes 39-40.
116. See supra note 4.
117. Concurring with Justice O'Connor in Part IIA of her opinion were Justices Scalia,
Powell, and Chief Justice Rehnquist.
118. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 107 S. Ct. 1031 (1987).
119. See supra note 1.
120. Asahi Metal Indus., 107 S. Ct. at 1031.
121. Id. at 1033.
122. Id.; see also supra note 85.
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Asahi's entrance into the stream of commerce sufficed as purposeful
availment. 123 Justice O'Connor stated that entrance of a component
into a product assembly process is not a sufficient contact in the ab-
sence of other forum-directed activity.
1 24
Justice O'Connor then proceeded to apply the fairness factors to
the burdens Asahi would face if forced to defend in California. 125 The
purpose of the fairness factors is to justify the assertion or denial of
jurisdiction. 126 The Justice concluded that the burden on Asahi
would be substantial for two reasons. First, Asahi was a Japanese
corporation that shipped its components from Japan to Taiwan based
on an agreement made in Taiwan, and none of their mutual business
activities occurred in California. 127 Second, the subject matter of the
litigation (i.e., indemnification) was important. 128 Justice O'Connor
stated that while Cheng Shin-a Taiwan corporation-had an interest
in the litigation, the original California tort plaintiff and the Califor-
nia forum possessed insignificant interests.129 Therefore, the unfair-
ness of haling Asahi into California to defend suit confirmed the
denial of jurisdiction over Asahi.
c. Justice Brennan's reasonableness and fairness burdens
Justice Brennan issued a separate opinion 30 where he denied ju-
risdiction because it would be unreasonable to submit Asahi to juris-
diction in California. 131 He also reaffirmed the stream of commerce
theory to support jurisdiction 32  and disagreed with Justice
O'Connor's opinion which required some additional act by the de-
fendant. 133 Rather, Justice Brennan held that bare entrance into the
stream of commerce was a sufficient contact because the chain of dis-
tribution is predictable, and defendant is therefore aware that his
123. Asahi, 107 S. Ct. at 1033.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1033-35. Part lIB of Justice O'Connor's opinion was joined by the entire
Court. Justice O'Connor stated that these fairness considerations are only addressed after the





130. Id. at 1035. Concurring in part and in the judgment with Justice Brennan were Jus-
tices White, Marshall, and Blackmun.
131. Id. Justice Brennan found Asahi's purposefully availing activity to be its entrance
into the stream of commerce. Id.
132. Id. at 1035-36.
133. Id. at 1035.
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product will reach the forum. 134 Based on this awareness, Justice
Brennan found a defendant may reasonably expect to be haled to that
forum. 35 However, because of the unique facts surrounding Asahi,
Justice Brennan concurred with Justice O'Connor's fairness analysis
and concluded that jurisdiction would not be proper.
d. Justice Stevens' opinion
36
Justice Stevens looked at the instrumentality (i.e., the valve) in-
volved and stated that the jurisdictional question turns on the "consti-
tutional determination that is affected by the volume, the value, and
the hazardous character of the components"' 137 in the litigation. Jus-
tice Stevens focused on the instrumentality because he felt the line
between mere awareness and purposeful availment was unclear. 138
More significantly, Justice Stevens stated that Justice O'Connor's
purposeful availment analysis was unnecessary to the holding. 139 He
reasoned that a finding of an unreasonable burden on the defendant is
enough to prohibit the assertion of jurisdiction.140 Justice Stevens be-
lieved that due process addresses whether it is reasonable for a de-
fendant to be haled into the forum, not whether the forum may assert
jurisdiction if the defendant lacks sufficient contacts. 14 1 Moreover, he
stated that the Court need not develop a "purposeful direction"' 142
type of test which requires the defendant to act toward the forum. 143
Justice Stevens essentially equated the reasonableness factors to mini-
mum contacts.
3. Analysis of the Opinion
The differing opinions in Asahi Metal Industry clearly illustrate
the problem trial courts encounter when they apply the minimum
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1038. Joined in part by Justices White and Blackmun.
137. Id.
138. Id. Justice Stevens stated that "[t]he Court seems to assume that an unwavering line
can be drawn between 'mere awareness'... and 'purposeful availment' of the forum's market."
Id.
139. Id. at 1038.
140. Id. Justice Stevens states "[a]n examination of minimum contacts is not always nec-
essary to determine whether a state court's assertion of personal jurisdiction is constitutional."
Id. (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476-78 (1985)).
141. Id.; see also supra note 4.
142. Asahi Metal Indus., 107 S. Ct. at 1038.
143. Id.
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contacts analysis in attempting to assert jurisdiction over component
manufacturers. While the Supreme Court intended to initiate a flexi-
ble standard in the jurisdictional analysis of World-Wide Volk-
swagen,144 the test has turned into a factually specific analysis of
contacts and fairness.
The United States Supreme Court has declined to establish just
how minimum the defendant's contacts may be while still supporting
jurisdiction. 145 As a result, lower courts utilize conclusionary terms
(e.g., the defendant's foreseeability that it will be haled into the forum,
the product's entrance into the stream of commerce, the defendant's
receipt of economic benefits, and the defendant's expectations of sales
in the forum) that lack substantive meaning. 146 Because the level of
contacts required for the proper assertion of jurisdiction has not been
adequately defined, courts have been encouraged to analyze only the
relative burdens on each party to litigate in plaintiff's selected fo-
rum. 147 After balancing these burdens, courts then extract whatever
facts exist to find minimum contacts.
For instance, the California Supreme Court relied on the fact
that Asahi should have reasonably been aware that its product would
reach California. Even though Asahi did not affirmatively conduct
activities towards that forum, the California Supreme Court asserted
jurisdiction. 14
8
a. Asahi holds the door open to three ambiguities
Both Justice Brennan's opinion 49 and Justice Stevens' opinion in
Asahi Metal Industry appear to conflict with World- Wide Volkswagen
on the issues of the defendant's minimum contacts and the fairness of
haling the defendant into the forum.150 The separate Asahi Metal In-
dustry opinions exemplify this conflict in three ways. First, by consid-
ering a defendant's knowledge that its product may end up in the
forum state as a contact sufficient to support jurisdiction, the court
greatly expands World- Wide Volkswagen's "foreseeability" discus-
144. See supra note 17.
145. See Note, supra note 31, at 842; Terez, supra note 6, at 940; Weinberg, supra note 15,
at 929.
146. E.g., Hedrick v. Daiko Shoji, 715 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1983).
147. Unfortunately, this leads to a balancing of the defendant's, forum state's, and plain-
tiff's interests. See supra note 17, and infra text accompanying notes 231-43.
148. See supra note 76.
149. The focus will be on Justice Brennan's opinion because there is an apparent majority
of the Court that will take this position.
150. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
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sion. 15 ' The World-Wide Volkswagen Court never intended this ra-
tionale of foreseeability to be the basis of the minimum contacts
test.' 52 Second, the World- Wide Volkswagen economic benefits dis-
cussion is likewise greatly expanded. In World-Wide Volkswagen,
Justice White clearly stated that economic benefits alone do not con-
fer jurisdiction. 5 3 Additionally, even if receipt of economic benefits
alone could support jurisdiction, Asahi's benefits arguably were de
minimis and would therefore probably be insufficient. 154 Finally, Jus-
tice Stevens' Asahi Metal Industry opinion emphasized the product's
presence in the forum, similar to the dissenters in World-Wide Volk-
swagen and Burger King. Focusing on the component's presence is
also troublesome because it does not assess the defendant's inten-
tional, forum-directed conduct. The entire purpose of the minimum
contacts analysis is to guarantee due process for the defendant.1
55
i. foreseeability as a derivative of stream of commerce activity
With respect to the foreseeability analysis, Justice Brennan fo-
cused on Asahi's awareness that its component would reach Califor-
nia because Asahi's valve entered the stream of commerce. Justice
Brennan treats foreseeability of the product's presence in the forum as
a significant factor in assessing a non-resident defendant's minimum
contacts with the forum. However, in World- Wide Volkswagen, Jus-
tice White specifically stated that foreseeability that the product may
be present in the forum is a result of the defendant's purposeful avail-
ment, not part of the actual minimum contacts test. 156
Logically, there is a problem with placing a heavy emphasis on a
non-resident defendant's awareness of his product's presence in the
forum state. California Supreme Court Justice Lucas addressed this
concern:
Gauging the propriety of asserting jurisdiction by whether the
party should reasonably expect to be hailed [sic] into court in the
forum is noted in World- Wide Volkswagen Corp. but not exclu-
sively relied upon and results in a logical vicious circle. If a forum
151. Ironically, this "foreseeability standard" as defined by the majority in World- Wide
Volkswagen was feared by the dissenters as being too narrow in its approach. Id. at 299 (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting) and id. at 313 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
152. See supra text accompanying notes 46-48.
153. See supra text accompanying notes 50-51.
154. See supra notes 107 & I11.
155. World- Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 296-97.
156. Id.
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routinely asserts jurisdiction, foreign parties will expect to be
hailed [sic] into court there. The more parties expect to be hailed
[sic] into court, the greater the propriety of the forum's
assertions. 
57
Justice Lucas illustrates the dangers a defendant may face if foresee-
ability of suit was the test. However, the problems with the foresee-
ability test cut both ways. The plaintiffs may be hurt by the standard
as well.
One commentator has faulted the World- Wide Volkswagen Court
for containing the same circular logic that was evidenced in the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court's Asahi Metal Industry opinion. Professor Jay
states:
[i]f the deciding factor is whether the defendant can anticipate be-
ing haled into court in a particular state, then a contrary result in
this very case would have informed manufacturers, distributors,
and retail sellers of their vulnerability .... Since judicial decisions
supply the measure of predictability, a reviewing court following
this approach should deny jurisdiction whenever the prior cases do
not point precisely toward liability to suit in the forum. This might
prevent the use of a perfectly fair forum on the sole ground that
there was no precedent for jurisdiction. 158
However, Professor Jay's statement must still consider that the
state has no authority to render judgment over that defendant when a
state asserts jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant who does not
possess minimum contacts with the forum state. 159
Furthermore, a defendant's affirmative solicitation of a market in
the forum state is distinguishable from a defendant's passive acquies-
cence when a third party manufacturer injects the component (i.e., in
the course of the stream of commerce) into a state as part of a finished
product.160 Passive acquiescence is a gray area because it obviously is
not a purposeful, forum-directed activity. Therefore, in cases of this
nature, the minimum contacts analysis will be a highly fact-dependent
inquiry into the defendant's burdens of defending in the forum. 161
In Asahi Metal Industry, there were two indications that Asahi
did not avail itself of the California forum. Primarily, these are prag-
157. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 39 Cal. 3d 35, 55 n.2, 702 P.2d 543, 555
n.2, 216 Cal. Rptr. 385, 397 n.2 (1985) (Lucas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
158. Jay, supra note 4, at 443.
159. See supra note 3.
160. See supra note 52.
161. See supra notes 18 & 76 and accompanying text.
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matic business concerns. Asahi's valve was a component part; there-
fore, it necessarily had to have been integrated into a part of another
product. Second, Cheng Shin never met its burden of proof that
Asahi purposefully availed itself of the California forum. 162 Asahi's
passive acquiescence in this case clearly is not the equivalent of an
intention to capture the California market.
1 63
ii. economic benefits and the minimum contacts analysis
The California Supreme Court majority opinion's treatment of
Asahi's economic benefits is superficial and cursory in light of the
World-Wide Volkswagen language. For example, the California
Supreme Court found that Asahi gained scant profits even though
Justice White expressly stated in World- Wide Volkswagen that "mar-
ginal revenues . . . [are] far too attenuated a contact to justify that
State's exercise of in personarn jurisdiction over [defendants]."
1'64
Second, the California Supreme Court found Asahi's minute fi-
nancial benefits from California stemmed from its indirect relation to
the forum state. Asahi was only related to California because it sold
parts to the Taiwan corporation who then sold twenty percent of its
assemblies to California. The California Supreme Court again consid-
ered this a contact despite Justice White's statement in World-Wide
Volkswagen that such benefits must originate from a "constitutionally
cognizable contact with that [s]tate" in order for jurisdiction over the
foreign manufacturer to be proper.
1 65
The California Supreme Court's finding that Asahi possessed suf-
ficient contacts with the California forum was specifically approved of
by Justice Brennan in his separate opinion in Asahi Metal Industry.16 6
Justice Brennan stated, "I do not agree with the plurality's... con-
clusion that Asahi did not 'purposely avail itself of the California
market.' 167 However, in approving the California Supreme Court's
reasoning, both Justice Brennan and the state supreme court ne-
glected to assess the extent Asahi intentionally directed its activities
162. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 39 Cal. 3d 35, 55, 702 P.2d 543, 554, 216
Cal. Rptr. 385, 396 (1985) (Lucas, J., dissenting).
163. See supra text accompanying notes 72-75.
164. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 299 (1980); see also supra
text accompanying notes 50-52.
165. Id. Once more, this determination turns on the extent Asahi received benefits from
California through Cheng Shin's sales. See also supra notes 107 & 111.
166. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 107 S. Ct. 1026, 1037 (1987).
167. Id. at 1035.
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toward California. Rather, the analysis used by the California court,
and approved by Justice Brennan, has quantified the defendant's eco-
nomic benefit from entrance into the stream of commerce as a suffi-
cient contact without really addressing Asahi's forum-directed and
intentional activities. 168
As illustrated by Justice Brennan's approval of the California
Supreme Court reasoning in the Justice's Asahi Metal Industry opin-
ion, the language in International Shoe Co. and its progeny is applied
without regard to a defendant's intentional forum-directed con-
tacts. 169 As a result, the minimum contacts determination has not
evolved into a flexible standard as intended170 but resembles a result-
oriented "analysis" to constitutionally assert jurisdiction over a for-
eign defendant who has insufficient ties with the forum state for juris-
dictional purposes.
iii. the chattel as the center of the minimum contacts inquiry
Finally, Justice Stevens' opinion 17' is not indicative of the nature
and quality of the defendant's contacts with the forum.172 Justice Ste-
vens placed emphasis on the valve assembly itself by relying on the
defendant's awareness of its product in the forum state. Under this
approach, the valve assembly became Asahi's agent for service of
process. 173
Similarly, Justice Marshall's and Justice Blackmun's dissent in
168. This Comment takes the position that the "apparent majority's" reasoning is not
persuasive in that one conclusion depends on the other. For the defendant to have reasonably
foreseen its product's presence in the forum, it must have gained substantial economic benefits.
Conversely, for the defendant to have gained substantial economic benefits from the forum
state, it must have been aware that its product would be present in the forum state. Therefore,
the "awareness" conclusion depends upon a finding that the defendant received substantial
economic benefit from the forum state which in turn depends on the defendant's awareness
that its product was present in the forum to generate such a benefit in the first place. See also
Jay, supra note 4, at 443; text accompanying notes 157-58.
169. See supra text accompanying notes 146-48.
170. See supra text accompanying note 18.
171. Asahi Metal Indus., 107 S. Ct. at 1038.
172. See supra notes 5 & 83.
173. Justice White who concurred with Justice Stevens in Asahi, discussed such a concept
in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 296 (1980). He stated, "if fore-
seeability were the criterion [in the jurisdictional analysis], a local California tire retailer could
be forced to defend in Pennsylvania when a blowout occurs there .... Every seller of chattels
would in effect appoint the chattel his agent for service of process. His amenability to suit
would travel with the chattel." Id.
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World- Wide Volkswagen 74 and Justice White's and Justice Stevens'
dissenting opinion in Burger King175 centered on the instrument in-
volved (i.e., the car and the contract) to support their positions. To
focus the inquiry on the instrument involved is flawed in two respects.
First, the component's ultimate location by itself does not affect the
foreign defendant's contacts with the forum state so that its presence
or place of execution will suddenly confer or deny jurisdiction.
176
Second, where the defendant never purposefully availed itself of the
forum state in the first place, the defendant cannot constitutionally be
subject to that forum's jurisdiction. 177 For a state to assert jurisdic-
tion then, the role of the product's presence in the forum must have
occurred as a result of the defendant's intentional conduct to place the
product in that forum.
Justice Brennan's dissent in World- Wide Volkswagen illustrated
why such a focus should be reliable: "business people, no matter how
local their business, cannot assume that goods remain in the business'
locality. Customers and goods can be anywhere in the country usu-
ally in a matter of hours and always in a matter of a very few days."'
178
This statement arguably is even more applicable to the component
manufacturer. The very nature of the component means that it will
be incorporated into another product which, in turn, will end up in a
number of markets, not necessarily of the component manufacturer's
choice.
According to this theory, a foreign manufacturer could conceiva-
bly be subject to jurisdiction in any state where the component assem-
bler ships the finished product. To subject the independent
distributor179 of the finished product to the forum state's jurisdiction
is an easy question since it has obviously purposefully availed itself of
the forum. However, to hale the foreign component manufacturer
into the forum, as well, goes against the "traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice" 180 when the defendant did not and could
not realistically control the component assembler. 18'
174. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 313-19 (Marshall, J., & Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
175. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 487 (1985) (White, J., & Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
176. See supra note 5.
177. Id.
178. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 309.
179. In this case, Cheng Shin.
180. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). See supra note 24.
181. There are genuine policy considerations that if the component is what caused the
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IV. THE PRAGMATIC CONCERNS: THE U.S.
FOREIGN TRADE DEFICIT
The majority of Justices in the United States Supreme Court ap-
parently will permit jurisdiction over a foreign corporation whose
product enters the stream of commerce. 182 The only way a foreign
corporation can be assured that it will not be subject to jurisdiction is
where the circumstances make jurisdiction so unreasonable as to be
unconstitutional, as was the case in Asahi.
However, not even this standard may be clear enough to let a
defendant know whether it will be subject to jurisdiction. The United
States Supreme Court has left open the question of whether the pres-
ence of defendant's property alone will be a sufficient contact in cases
where the plaintiff has no alternative forum. 8 3 For example, a court
may search more deeply to find a defendant's contacts, if the court is
cognizant that the plaintiff has no other United States forum avail-
able. In this manner, the court may decide that the defendant's "con-
tact" was the presence of his property in the forum. The court could
assert jurisdiction by reasoning that since the defendant foresaw its
product's ultimate destination, it would be reasonable to subject the
product failure, that component manufacturer should be held accountable as well as the as-
sembler. However, this does not, a fortiori, subject the the component manufacturer to that
forum state's jurisdiction.
Rather, the appropriate remedy is for the component assembler to seek indemnification
from the manufacturer in a forum where the defendant is under jurisdiction. Mere risk of
inconsistent obligations will not automatically change the nature and quality of the defendant's
contacts.
However, this was not a problem in Asahi. Justice Lucas' dissent states the plaintiffs
settled with all of the named defendants. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 39 Cal. 3d
35, 55, 702 P.2d 543, 555, 216 Cal. Rptr. 385, 397 (1985). Furthermore, Justice Lucas stated:
"even before settlement the California plaintiffs showed no interest in Asahi. Plaintiffs never
sought to serve Asahi as an additional defendant although it must have been apparent... that
Asahi was potentially liable." Id.
182. In addition to the Justices who joined Justice Brennan's opinion in Asahi, Justice
Stevens' focus on the instrumentality itself most likely indicates he would vote for a stream of
commerce rationale. However, Justice Stevens also rejected a "mere awareness" standard that
a defendant's knowledge may be enough. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 107 S. Ct.
1026, 1031 (1987). If the product involved was one of many in the forum and of a fairly
hazardous nature, then Justice Stevens would probably allow jurisdiction coupled with the
defendant's foreseeability as a contact. Id.
183. The presence of the defendant's property in the forum as a contact was discussed in a
footnote to Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977). The majority opinion, by Justice Marshall,
stated "[t]his case does not raise, and we therefore do not consider, the question whether the
presence of a defendant's property in a [s]tate is a sufficient basis for jurisdiction when no other
forum is available to the plaintiff." Id. at 211 n.37 (emphasis added).
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defendant to suit there.18 4
Thus, the only bar left to asserting jurisdiction over the defend-
ant would be the unreasonable burden on the defendant of defending
in the forum state. 1 85 Resolution of the jurisdictional question by this
means would implicate two concerns. First, the realities of the United
States trade deficit 186 may play a significant role in the constitutional
determination. Second, as the defendant's in Helicopteros Nacionales
de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall 1 8 7 argued, there may be a denial of equal
protection under the fourteenth amendment. The equal protection




The United States trade deficit18 9 raises pressing and immediate
concerns.'9° Courts may feel inclined to deter foreign manufacturers
from entering the U.S. market place because of the trade imbalance.
For instance, Professor Weinberg suggests a "hidden agenda" was
present behind the Court's decision in Helicopteros.1 91 The defend-
ant's contacts in Helicopteros consisted mainly of purchases of the fo-
184. See, e.g., Hedrick v. Daiko Shoji, 715 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1983). In addition, Profes-
sor Weinberg rationalizes this idea by stating "[foreign corporations] contemplate tort litiga-
tion somewhere." Weinberg, supra note 15, at 929 (emphasis in original). But see supra text
accompanying notes 157-58.
185. See infra text accompanying notes 245-62.
186. The foreign trade deficit takes into account merchandise, investment earnings, tour-
ism, and foreign aid. L.A. Times, Mar. 18, 1987, § IV, at 3, col. 4. However, in merchandise
trade, the United States has been in a deficit for fifteen out of sixteen years. Id.
187. 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
188. The Court's consideration of the convenience factors also raises a constitutional prob-
lem. Professor Weinberg states that the defendants in Helicopteros alleged discriminatory in-
tent by the lower court. Weinberg, supra note 15, at 931. She agrees that balancing each
party's interests, "if it is to be permitted, does lead to different treatment of some defendants."
Id. at 932.
189. A proposed trade bill was introduced by the House Ways and Means Committee
Chairman Dan Rostenkowski (D-Ill.) and trade subcommittee Chairman Sam Gibbons (D-
Fla.) in March 1987. L.A. Times, Mar. 11, 1987, § IV, at 1, col. 5. The proposed bill repre-
sented an effort to reduce the United States deficit without being unduly protectionist in na-
ture. Id. Representative Gibbons was quoted as describing Japan's trade surplus "obscene,
unwise and unsustainable" yet he would not propose automatic retaliation because of its ille-
gality under international trade agreements. Id.
190. Weinberg, supra note 15, at 928-29; Weinberg states "if anxiety about foreign trade
induced the Supreme Court to cast the Helicopteros widows and children abroad to seek relief,
the Court did not say so. Instead, it manipulated abstract catch phrases in order to serve a
purpose outside the concerns of the due process clause." Id. at 929.
191. Weinberg, supra note 15, at 929.
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rum state's products. 192 Weinberg proposes that the assertion of
jurisdiction over a foreign defendant based on the defendant's
purchases would implicate foreign trade policy by "creat[ing] unfa-
vorable repercussions for the balance of payments." 193  Weinberg be-
lieved the assertion of jurisdiction would have "unfavorable
repercussions" since the result would be to decrease foreign purchases
of U.S. manufactured products. 194 However, she then proceeds to
counter this argument by stating, "American products will continue
to be purchased to the extent they fill needs on the international mar-
ket at the right price."1 9
Weinberg's legitimate concern regarding the effects on trade pol-
icy following the Helicopteros decision may certainly be adopted in a
case such as Asahi. In fact, since Asahi involves foreign sales in the
United States rather than purchases as in Helicopteros, Weinberg's
concerns may be more relevant. For example, a trial court may exer-
cise jurisdiction despite attenuated contacts because it wants to dis-
courage sales of foreign merchandise in the United States. The
court's rationale for this decision would range from a finding of mini-
mum contacts, reasonableness to a defendant of defending in the fo-
rum, 19 6 jurisdiction by necessity,1 97 and finally, public policy. Despite
the defendant's lack of sufficient contacts, the court may be inclined
to find jurisdiction to deter foreign corporations from manufacturing
and distributing products for sale in the United States.
If the defendant lacks sufficient contacts, the court nevertheless
may feel inclined to find any contact to be a "sufficient" one. An
example of a contact used in this manner would be the defendant's
awareness that its product's ultimate destination was the forum state.
The court would justify this as a sufficient contact based on a "fore-
seeability" rationale. Since this "purposeful" act is hardly intentional,
the court would then have to confirm the assertion of jurisdiction by
relying on the fairness factors that the defendant is not unduly bur-
dened by defending in the forum.
Ultimately, the court must engage in balancing each party's in-
terests to justify its decision to allow jurisdiction. At this point, the
192. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 410-11.
193. Weinberg, supra note 15, at 929. She bases this argument on amicus curiae briefs
filed by the Justice Department. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. See infra text accompanying notes 231-34.
197. See infra text accompanying notes 263-71.
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court will then consider all types of factors, even those that it consti-
tutionally should not consider. Specifically, the foreign trade deficit
concern may enter into the balancing analysis under the guise of the
state's interests. The forum's interests would be asserted as a need to
deter foreign manufacturers from making unsafe products for sale in
the U.S. However, as Professor Weinberg has suggested, the real de-
terrent effect may center more on remedying the trade imbalance
rather than protecting residents from injury. 98
Additionally, the court may also show a genuine concern for the
injured plaintiff. As part of the plaintiff's interests, the court would
consider whether the plaintiff may lack any other United States forum
should there be no jurisdiction in the case before it. 199 Yet, neither
the state's need to deter sales, nor jurisdiction by necessity create suffi-
cient contacts by which the court may properly assert jurisdiction.
V. THE FUTURE OF THE MINIMUM CONTACTS ANALYSIS
A. The Ninth Circuit Approach
Data Disc, Inc. v. Systems Technology Associates2° 0 recognized
three crucial factors in the minimum contacts assessment:
1) The non resident defendant must do some act or consummate
some transaction with the forum or perform some act by which he
purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities
in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its
laws. 2) The claim must be one which arises out of or results from
the defendant's forum-related activities. 3) Exercise of jurisdiction
must be reasonable.
20'
These requirements sought to insure that the assertion of juris-
diction over the non-resident defendant was constitutional. 20 2 The
problem with the Data Disc test is its lack of precise standards. 20 3
Additionally, the Data Disc court did not assign the relative weights
of these various factors in the jurisdictional determination, nor did it
sufficiently comply with the basic constitutional requirements con-
cerning the defendant's due process rights.20 4 Nevertheless, the Data
Disc test helps in presenting a solution to the present confusion of the
198. See supra text accompanying notes 190-95.
199. See infra text accompanying notes 263-71.
200. 557 F.2d 1280 (9th Cir. 1977).
201. Id. at 1287.
202. Id.
203. See, e.g., Hedrick v. Daiko Shoji, 715 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1983).
204. See supra note 1.
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courts by laying a foundation for a more precise inquiry. Moreover,
by redefining and fine-tuning these three Data Disc criteria, the in-
quiry will become more meaningful.
B. A Possible Solution
Many commentators have written on the various analyses used
by the courts in the jurisdiction determination. This Comment pro-
poses a solution by assimilating these various viewpoints in light of
the Supreme Court's language. Additionally, this Comment also pro-
poses to borrow tort concepts to clarify "minimum contacts." The
principles in the various Supreme Court cases are enforced when each
of these ideas are brought together.
1. The Intentional Conduct Requirement
The threshold inquiry necessarily must be whether the defendant
purposefully availed itself of the forum state by some intentional, fo-
rum-directed act.20 5 Essentially, this requirement seeks to define what
are the quality and nature of the defendant's contacts. There are two
important considerations in this assessment.
First, the minimum contacts analysis must be made from the de-
fendant's perspective vis-a-vis the forum state. This focus derives
from the principles enunciated in International Shoe Co. 20
6
One scholar has presented a suggested minimum contacts analy-
sis based on the International Shoe Co. language which revolves solely
around a defendant's due process rights. The defendant is the only
party at the jurisdictional inquiry who possesses due process rights.
20 7
Professor Sonenshein further states that plaintiffs cannot argue a de-
nial of due process based on their inability to bring a lawsuit because
the "state is free to close its doors to any or all litigation. ' 20 8 How-
ever, defendants have a legitimate due process concern when they are
haled into a forum where they have no contacts. 209 Therefore, the
205. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985); see also Ottonello, supra
note 4, at 21. This commentator suggests that the sole question in the jursidictional analysis
should be whether the defendant purposefully availed itself of the benefits and protections of
the forum's laws. Id.
206. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
207. See Sonenshein, supra note 4, at 48; see also infra notes 244-47 and accompanying
text; see also Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472 n. 13; Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v.
Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984); Chung v. Nana Dev. Corp., 783 F.2d 1124, 1129-30 (4th Cir. 1986).




only material relationship at the jurisdictional inquiry is the defend-
ant's relation to the forum state.
210
The second important consideration to ascertain whether the de-
fendant possesses minimum contacts involves the "intentional" versus
"negligent" standards of the defendant's conduct. 21 I This Comment
proposes that this first prong of the test be characterized as the "in-
tentional conduct requirement" rather than "purposeful availment."
The "intentional" approach analyzes a defendant's affirmative, fo-
rum-directed activity.
212
Where the defendant intentionally directs himself, a forum may
constitutionally assert jurisdiction over the defendant because this in-
tentional activity demonstrates he has "purposefully avail[ed] himself
of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum.
'213
In contrast, a "negligence" analysis falls short of the constitu-
tional directives. No state shall "make binding a judgment in per-
sonam against an individual or corporate defendant with which the
state has no contacts, ties, or relations. ' 21 4 For this reason, the
World-Wide Volkswagen opinion disapproved a negligence-type fore-
seeability standard as the test in the minimum contacts analysis.21 5
Consequently, courts should refrain from an analysis which mirrors
this "negligence" type of inquiry.
Another commentator, however, has advocated an approach
which would abandon the minimum contacts requirement in its en-
tirety. Instead, his analysis would focus on the fairness to a defendant
in defending in the forum state. 216 Professor Weintraub believes that
the due process concerns of the fourteenth amendment apply to these
fairness factors. 2 17 His approach would take into account advances in
technology. Such advances would lessen the burden a foreign defend-
ant would confront. This radical approach of abandoning the mini-
mum contacts analysis in its entirety contradicts the Supreme Court's
210. But see Weinberg, supra note 15, at 925.
211. See supra text accompanying notes 83-87.
212. See supra text accompanying notes 83 & 85.
213. Data Disc Inc. v. Systems Technology Assoc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1287 (9th Cir. 1977);
see supra notes 85-86.
214. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945) (citing Pennoyer v.
Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877)).
215. See supra text accompanying note 45.
216. Weintraub, supra note 4, at 522. Weintraub frames the issue as "whether it is so
unfair to exercise jurisdiction over the defendant that his due process rights are violated." Id.
at 522-23.
217. Weintraub, supra note 4, at 522-23.
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language in the cases construing specific personal jurisdiction which
require a purposeful act by the defendant. 218
Professor Weintraub further posits that the foreign corporate de-
fendant has more funds to expend than the injured plaintiff.219 As a
result, Weintraub believes the minimum contacts analysis should be
abandoned because it does not consider each parties' interests.
220
However, Weintraub's model is not viable because the Supreme Court
requires the defendant to possess minimum contacts with the forum
state. Such contacts must be of an intentional nature to meet the
Supreme Court's requirements.
221
2. The "Arising Out Of" Requirement
The next Data Disc prong requires that the plaintiff's cause of
action result from the defendant's intentionally directed conduct. If a
court concludes that a foreign defendant has intentionally directed its
activities toward the forum state, then the court must require a con-
nection between the defendant's forum-directed activity and the plain-
tiff's cause of action before asserting jurisdiction. 222 A problem arises
if a court does not clearly distinguish between the plaintiff's cause of
action being "related to" 223 the defendant's activity (i.e., the contact
does not breed the cause of action) and "arising out of" 224 the defend-
ant's purposeful activity (i.e., the cause of action is a creation of the
contact).
225
218. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476-77 (1985).
219. Weintraub, supra note 4, at 526.
220. Id.
221. See supra text accompanying notes 83-84.
222. Data Disc Inc. v. Systems Technology Assoc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1287 (9th Cir. 1977);
see also supra note 3.
223. An example of plaintiff's cause of action which relates to the defendant's contact is
illustrated by the facts in Helicopteros. The plaintiffs instituted a wrongful death action which
was related to the defendant's alleged negligent acts in South America. However, the defend-
ant's contacts in Texas consisted primarily of equipment purchases in Texas. Helicopteros
Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 409-10 (1984).
224. An example of plaintiff's cause of action which arises out of the defendant's contact is
illustrated by Burger King. The defendant's contact with the forum state was his intentional
solicitation to contract with a Florida corporation. Plaintiff's lawsuit arose out of the defend-
ant's conduct in a subsequent breach of contract suit.
225. See Terez, supra note 6, at 941-42 for a discussion on how much of a relationship is
necessary; see also Note, supra note 31, at 840. The Helicopteros Court was criticized for
determining whether plaintiff's cause of action arose out of or related to the defendant's con-
tacts. However, the Note states that the "Court would require a substantive or legal connec-
tion, in contrast to a mere factual relation, between the cause of action and the forum contacts
to satisfy the exercise of specific jurisdiction." Id.
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One commentator has categorized the distinction as being be-
tween general and specific jurisdiction.226 For example, if the court
were to find that the defendant possessed the requisite minimum con-
tacts, but the plaintiff's cause of action was only related to and did
not arise out of that contact, then the court, in effect, would be exer-
cising a form of general jurisdiction.227 In essence, the courts would
be applying a "but for" 228 test, even though there would be an absence
of the "systematic and continuous" 229 activity that has traditionally
justified such jurisdiction.23 0 For this reason, it is imperative that the
courts find that plaintiff's cause of action arose out of the defendant's
purposeful activity.
3. The Role of the Plaintiff's and State's Interests
Finally, the third prong of the Data Disc test relates to the so-
called "reasonableness" or "convenience" aspect of asserting jurisdic-
tion. 231 This factor takes into account each of the parties' interests in
having the matter tried in the forum state. The courts presently con-
sider this prong by balancing each parties' interests.232 While there
may be strong policy arguments233 for employing a balancing or slid-
ing scale234 approach, there nevertheless exists more pressing and fun-
damental constitutional arguments against it.235
Professor Sonenshein has advocated what this Comment believes
is the appropriate role of the plaintiff's and the forum state's inter-
ests.236 In theory, he uses the language in Shaffer v. Heitner237 to
create a tripartite nexus of the plaintiff's interests, the state's interests,
and the defendant's interests. 238 Similar to the Data Disc nexus re-
quirement that the plaintiff's cause of action arise out of the defend-
226. Terez, supra note 6, at 936.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
230. Terez, supra note 6, at 936.
231. Data Disc Inc. v. Systems Technology Assoc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1287 (9th Cir. 1977).
232. The reasonableness factors are also called the convenience factors.
233. See infra Part IV of text; see also Weintraub, supra note 4, at 516. Professor Wein-
traub states, "[w]hen a court sees blood on the ground, it is very likely to find jurisdiction over
a non-resident seller of the product that caused the injury." Id.; see also Hay, supra note 20, at
38.
234. E.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476-78 (1985).
235. See supra note 3; see also infra text accompanying notes 251-54.
236. Sonenshein, supra note 4, at 52-53.
237. 433 U.S. 186 (1977); see also Terez, supra note 6, at 937.
238. Sonenshein, supra note 4, at 52.
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ant's intentional, forum-directed conduct, Sonenshein requires that
the litigation be connected--or have a relationship--to the forum.239
However, he states that this connection alone is insufficient to estab-
lish jurisdiction over the defendant when there is no connection be-
tween the defendant and forum state as well.24° Consequently, the
triad is completed by the defendant-forum nexus. This relationship
essentially is the requisite minimum contacts the defendant must pos-
sess with the forum state.
Thus, the third aspect of the specific personal jurisdiction analy-
sis ultimately is concerned with the defendant's intentional conduct in
the forum state. 241 The nexus between the plaintiff's litigation and
the forum state, and the defendant's relation to the forum, illuminate
the extent to which the defendant may have intentionally directed its
activities at the forum. However, the litigation-forum connections do
not by themselves support jurisdiction.
242
Moreover, to credit the plaintiff's interests and state's interests
with more weight than proposed above would be, in effect, a prema-
ture venue and forum non conveniens analysis.
243
C. Fine-Tuning the Analysis
1. Constitutionalized Venue
244
When the analysis proceeds to narrowly focus on the defendant's
intentional contacts with the forum, the plaintiff's interests and the
forum's interests are not crucial. In fact, to afford the other interests
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Ottonello, supra note 4, at 30. Ottonello states that the "outcome of the minimum
contacts test, therefore, necessarily determines the fairness of exercising jurisdiction in light of
the defendant's inconvenience .... [T]he inconvenience of the parties should not be weighed
against the constitutional requirement of minimum contacts." Id.
242. See Terez, supra note 6, at 937-38. Terez makes the defendant-forum relationship the
base of his triangular analysis, involving the defendant's, forum's, and plaintiff's interests.
Professor Sonenshein did not include the plaintiff's interests as a separate consideration.
Sonenshein, supra note 4, at 53. Rather, plaintiff's interests, along with the state's interests,
composes the litigation-forum connection. Id. Furthermore, the "plaintiff's interests" in the
litigation-forum connection is in part dependent on the Data Disc second prong requirement
that the plaintiff's cause of action arise out of the defendant's conduct. Louis, The Grasp of
Long-Arm Jurisdiction Finally Exceeds its Reach: A Comment of World- Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson and Rush v. Savchuk, 58 N.C.L. REV. 407, 421 (1980).
243. See infra text accompanying notes 244-62; see also Sonenshein, supra note 4, at 55;
Ottonello, supra note 4, at 22, 23.
244. This is termed "constitutionalized venue" because these venue factors are afforded
constitutional weight via the due process clause.
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greater weight than already relegated, would be improper. Several
commentators24 5 have proposed that consideration of a defendant's
claim of unreasonable jurisdiction during the jurisdictional analysis
ultimately is a forum non conveniens inquiry.
Typically, a defendant's claim that jurisdiction is unreasonable
would arise in the following manner: under the current Ninth Circuit
Data Disc test, 246 plaintiffs would initially specify the defendant's con-
tacts with the forum state. Plaintiff would also demonstrate that his
cause of action arose out of the defendant's contacts, as well as that
jurisdiction over the defendant would be reasonable. However, plain-
tiff's primary burden is establishing defendant's contacts. 247 The de-
fendant is then left with two alternatives to challenge the jurisdiction.
First, he will argue that he lacks contacts with the forum. In the
alternative, defendant will argue that even if he is found to possess the
requisite contacts with the forum, the individual circumstances of his
case make the assertion of jurisdiction unreasonable.
If the extent of the defendant's contacts with the forum state are
questionable, then under the Data Disc approach, the courts must ap-
ply the remaining two prongs. One of these requirements is the
"nexus" factor. The courts generally have not analyzed this point
very carefully. 248 Thus, the courts are left to the "reasonableness"
prong. One commentator considers the elements involved in this
third prong to be "virtually identical to those evaluated under the
doctrine of forum non conveniens when a court is asked to decline to
exercise the jurisdiction it concededly possesses.
'249
Ottonello further suggests that the plaintiff and forum interests
add nothing to the analysis once the defendant's minimum contacts
245. Sonenshein, supra note 4, at 55; Ottonello, supra note 4, at 23; but see Weintraub,
supra note 4, at 523.
246. See supra text accompanying notes 200-01.
247. Data Disc Inc. v. Systems Technology Assoc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1285, 1287 (9th Cir.
1977).
248. E.g., Hedrick v. Daiko Shoji, 715 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1977).
249. Ottonello, supra note 4, at 23. To illustrate his theory, Ottonello cites the California
Supreme Court case of Buckeye Boiler v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 3d 893, 458 P.2d 57, 80 Cal.
Rptr. 113 (1969). The court in Buckeye implemented a two-prong test where the plaintiff first
had to establish the defendant's contacts. Id. at 898, 458 P.2d at 62, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 118.
Then, the court considered the "propriety" of asserting jurisdiction based on whether the fo-
rum state was the most convenient forum. Id. However, as Ottonello points out, the lower
California courts have not embraced Buckeye's convenience factor component. Ottonello,
supra note 4. Furthermore, the California Supreme Court in Asahi cited to Buckeye, but did
not rely on it.
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are demonstrated. 250 In fact, assessing the defendant's convenience
factors at the jurisdictional stage may actually work to the plaintiff's
and forum's detriment.251 Ottonello presents the following example:
if the convenience factors carried the weight the Asahi majority ap-
parently affords them, then any defendant who is constitutionally
amenable to suit may still be able to defeat jurisdiction.212 The de-
fendant would have to show that the assertion of jurisdiction would
be so unreasonable in its case that it infringes on his due process
right.25 3 If the court is convinced that jurisdiction would be unrea-
sonable, the court lacks jurisdiction and must dismiss the case.
In contrast, if the convenience factors were left to their proper
status in the forum non conveniens analysis, then the court would
maintain jurisdiction over the defendant in any event. If the defend-
ant presented the same claim of unreasonableness, the action would
not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Rather, the action would be
transferred and the plaintiff could still have his day in court.254
Therefore, to ensure fairness to both the plaintif2 55 and the defend-
ant,2 56 this Comment suggests the convenience factors should be
stricken from the jurisdictional inquiry. These factors arise once the
court possesses jurisdiction over the defendant. Then, the court is free
to scrutinize the competing interests involved by implementing a
proper forum non conveniens analysis.
However, under Professor Weintraub's proposal257 to abandon
250. Ottonello, supra note 4, at 35.
251. The defendant's detriment is of a constitutional dimension and has already been
discussed.
252. Id. at 37.
253. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 309 (1980) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
254. Professor Sonenshein reads the Burger King opinion as approval that the defendant's
inconveniences will be resolved by applying the forum non conveniens standards. Sonenshein,
supra note 4, at 57; Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477-78 (1985). Addition-
ally, since theforum non conveniens analysis also assesses the forum state's interests, a transfer
of the action could, presumably, remove the action to a forum which possesses a greater inter-
est in the action than the original forum.
255. Fairness is discussed in the context of the plaintiff's interests as being equated with
the plaintiff's ability to bring a lawsuit against a defendant who does possess minimum con-
tacts. A forum non conveniens inquiry at the jurisdictional stage may rob the court of jurisdic-
tion if the defendant can assert enough facts to make jurisdiction unreasonable. Plaintiff's case
would then be dismissed; see also supra text accompanying note 208.
256. The fairness standard afforded a defendant relates to whether due process permits a
forum to assert jurisdiction over a defendant where the defendant has no contacts with the
forum, but would not be inconvenienced by defending there.
257. See supra text accompanying notes 216-20.
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the minimum contacts analysis and focus instead on the fairness of
asserting jurisdiction over a defendant, the role of the convenience
factors is unclear. Weintraub asserts that under his proposed analy-
sis, forum non conveniens is still crucial. 258 He posits a hypothetical
where jurisdiction over a defendant, though reasonable, may never-
theless be unwise. 259 He states: "[t]he defendant may be able to show
that suit in another available forum will be more convenient for the
parties and witnesses and will avoid placing unnecessary burdens and
expenses on local courts.
' '260
The forum non conveniens role in Professor Weintraub's model
reveals the model's flaw. Since his inquiry has already analyzed the
fairness of asserting jurisdiction over a defendant, jurisdiction is pre-
sumptively constitutional. 261  Necessarily then, if by assessing the
plaintiff and state convenience factors, the court concludes the present
forum is "unwise," then these convenience factors defeat the constitu-
tionality of even asserting jurisdiction. Part of the original assessment
whether jurisdiction was fair must have included the defendant's con-
venience factors in defending in a particular forum.
Professor Weintraub's theory allows a forum non conveniens in-
quiry to switch forums because of plaintiffs interests. The entire set
of conditions which made jurisdiction fair to begin with are now com-
pletely different. In effect, Professor Weintraub's jurisdictional re-
form has collapsed into solely a constitutionalized venue approach. 26
2
His model illustrates the importance of separating the minimum con-
tacts requirement from the conveniences/fairness factors.
2. Jurisdiction by Necessity 263
In the international market, the concept of jurisdiction by neces-
sity is more readily apparent in actions brought by injured plaintiffs in
the United States. The facts in Asahi and Helicopteros illustrate a sce-
nario implicating this doctrine. The plaintiff, an individual suffering
personal injuries, sues a large, international manufacturer in the plain-
258. Weintraub, supra note 4, at 523.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. According to Professor Weintraub's reform, fairness is equated with constitutional
due process concerns. Id. at 486.
262. See supra note 244.
263. The doctrine of jurisdiction by necessity was raised in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S.
186, 211 n.37 (1977), where the Court left open the question of whether property could suffice
as a contact if the plaintiff did not have an alternative forum. Id.
19881
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
tiff's own state. Significantly, however, the foreign defendant lacks
direct and purposeful ties with the plaintiff's forum, or any other fo-
rum, within the United States.264 In a sense, plaintiff's choice of fo-
rum is the only forum available to him. If he is not allowed to sue in
that forum, he is faced with suing abroad.
However, when the forum state attempts to assert jurisdiction
over the defendant, the court may not properly do so since the defend-
ant did not conduct any purposeful activity. Under the analysis pro-
posed by this Comment, the case would then have to be dismissed.
Professor Weinberg has criticized this harsh result to the plaintiff.
265
To illustrate, she feels that when balancing the conveniences,
"the lack of an alternative forum in the United States for the widows
and children in Helicopteros does make a difference. ' 266 Professor
Weinberg underscores the realities of plaintiffs suing abroad in terms
of the damages 267 and the foreign judicial proceedings 268 they face.
Thus, as Professor Weintruab notes, in Helicopteros, "[i]f there is
a jurisdictional problem, it is caused by the 'minimum contacts' re-
quirement. '269 This statement is precisely the issue. Minimum con-
tacts assure constitutional due process to the defendant, who after all,
has no control (subject to a default judgment) when the plaintiff initi-
ates a lawsuit. The fact that the plaintiff may have no alternative fo-
rum will not suddenly confer jurisdiction over the defendant. If
plaintiff's lack of an alternative forum forces a court to hold defend-
ant amenable to suit, the due process requirements vanish.270 Rather
than ignoring the constitutional guarantees assured through the mini-
mum contacts approach, reforms in jurisdiction by necessity cases lie
elsewhere. 271
264. See infra text accompanying notes 272-74.
265. Weinberg, supra note 15, at 932.
266. Id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 198-99.
267. Id. at 933.
268. Id. at 934.
269. Weintraub, supra note 4, at 510.
270. Essentially, jurisdiction by necessity cases exemplify where due process concerns ap-
ply. When the plaintiff is injured and has no alternative United States forum, the view that due
process concerns should go to the defendant's inconveniences is much more palatable than
focusing on the defendant's contacts alone. See supra note 3.
271. Hay, supra note 53, at 453. He states that there:
are policy considerations in favor of the exercise of jurisdiction by the forum [in
jurisdiction by necessity cases]. But policy does not make for constitutionality. It is
suggested, however, that a 'national contacts' approach safeguards the foreign de-
fendant's due process rights as much as a forum state contacts approach is designed





An aggregate contacts or national contacts approach applies a
minimum contacts analysis to the foreign defendant's contacts with
the United States as opposed to an individual forum state.272 How-
ever, as Professor Weintraub notes, an aggregate contacts solution is
still subject to the same flaws as a minimum contacts inquiry.273 He
states that the convenience factors must still be weighed even after the
court assesses the defendant's aggregate contacts.
274
VI. CONCLUSION
The courts must return to the basic principles of the minimum
contacts analysis that World-Wide Volkswagen and Burger King
enunciate. To summarize, the courts must employ a three part test
for a court to constitutionally assert jurisdiction over a non-resident
defendant. First, the court must initially find that the defendant has
engaged in intentional conduct with the forum state. Then, the court
must analyze whether the plaintiff's cause of action arises out of or
results from the defendant's conduct. The "nexus" must be more
than a mere relation; rather, the cause of action must be a result of
that contact. Finally, the court may look at the forum state and the
plaintiff's concerns only to the extent that these factors illuminate
either of the first two prongs. With such an analysis, the process af-
forded a defendant will be due process.
Diana K Tani*
272. Weintraub, supra note 4, at 510-11.
273. Id. at 511.
274. Id. Furthermore, Professor Weinberg raises additional questions emerging at the
convenience stage. Weinberg, supra note 15, at 938-39. For example, when addressing the
forum's interest, is it the particular forum state's interest which is being assessed, or the na-
tion's interest? Id. at 939. The aggregate contacts doctrine and its difficulties are beyond the
scope of this Comment. See generally Lilly, Jurisdiction Over Domestic and Alien Defendants,
69 VA. L. REV. 85 (1983); Note, National Contacts as a Basis for In Personam Jurisdiction over
Aliens in Federal Question Suits, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 686 (1982).
* The author would like to thank Associate Professor Richard Macias of Loyola Law
School for his thoughtful contributions to this article.
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